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This paper outlines what are the likely global „events‟ that peak oil could 
induce in our highly globalised world including supply disruption, volatility in 
prices and progressive price rises. All these will impact on our cities. We then 
pose three indicative development scenarios and assess them as a risk 
management exercise to examine the relative vulnerability of urban 
development scenarios and what pattern of development will provide the 
greatest opportunity for responding to this challenge. Finally a „glimpse of the 
future in 2040‟ is presented to show how the combination of new technology 
and good urban planning can enable us to make better cities in the future.  
 
Background 
Peak oil is a contested issue. When a barrel of oil reached $140 in mid 2008, 
the world began to remember those who had been predicting a global peak 
for over 30 years since the first oil shocks began in the 1970‟s. The science of 
how any non-renewable resource can be exploited suggests its production 
cycle will follow a bell curve with a „peak‟ roughly at the halfway point.  World 
supplies of conventional oil probably peaked in 2008 and have begun to 
decline at between 3% and 6% per year (Aleklett 2009). 
The availability of unconventional oil from deep sea reserves and from 
petroleum resources like tar sands and shale oil will mean that the world can 
provide some replacements but at a significant cost and, within a decade they 
are likely to peak(Zittel & Schindler 2007; Robelius 2007; Aleklett et al 2009; 
Campbell 2009),. The world of cheap oil appears to be over. This is a serious 
discontinuity from previous city and regional economic development eras 
which were based around cheap fuel for transport. 
The peak oil issue is a global one and no place is immune from its impacts. 
There are only 14 countries that export more oil than they import, Australia is 
no longer one of these. With its domestic oil production having peaked in 
2000 and declining at 11% per year, Australia is now an oil importer (ACIL 
Tasman 2008). In June 2009 we imported 45% of oil needs and this gap is 
projected to grow rapidly at a time when global supplies are tighter and 
tighter.  
The scenarios outlined in this document will provide the basis for 
understanding peak oil, what are the risks and opportunities with peak oil, and 
what actions are suggested for Australian cities in the short term and the long 
term. 
 
There will be different impacts depending on the level of vulnerability to oil in 
different cities and within cities. On a global scale the differences between 
cities in their oil consumption per capita is huge. Kenworthy et al (2001) have 
collected data on 84 cities comparing the amount of transport fuel per capita. 
Australian cities are twice as vulnerable as most European cities. In cases like 
Barcelona, Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo (which are all around the same 
or at higher income levels than Australian cities) they are four to five times 
less vulnerable to transport fuel issues related to peak oil. 
Recent data from Kenworthy (pers com 2010) shows that most cities analysed 
in the global sample have decreased in their transport fuel use per capita 
between 1995 and 2005; however Australia cities all increased to 2005 but 
since then an interesting phenomenon has been a consistent decrease in car 
use per capita and dramatic increase in public transport that bodes well for a 
transition to reduced fuel vulnerability (Newman and Scheurer; 2010; Stanley, 
2010).  
Within cities similar variations can be found as between cities. The City of 
Sydney uses one tenth of the transport fuel used by outer suburbs in Sydney 
on a per capita basis (Trubka, Newman and Bilsborough, 2008).  Dodson & 
Sipe (2005 and 2006) examined each Australian city in terms of vulnerability 
to oil price increases and the ability to repay mortgages.  In this remarkably 
prescient study, which was done before the global financial crisis (GFC), they 
found that the car dependent residents of outer suburbs that are poorly 
serviced by public transport are highly vulnerable to the combination of high 
fuel prices and mortgage debt. This was clearly experienced on a practical 
level by thousands of families across Australian cities.  
Across Australia there is a growing awareness of the need to respond to peak 
oil. Mostly this is coming from local governments like Gold Coast, Maribynong 
and Lake Macquarrie though the Queensland Government has included oil 
vulnerability in the SEQ Plan and it is required to be considered in all local 
government strategic plans (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). One of 
the reasons that peak oil has not been included in planning systems in 
Australia is that governments are not able to imagine the kind of scenarios for 
the future that could eventuate and are not aware of the kind of risks that 
could be involved in not addressing peak oil. Thus we will next set out three 
potential scenarios for what peak oil could do to our cities and how we may 
need to address these. The approach was used to help the Gold Coast City 
Council address peak oil (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010).  
 
Some likely peak oil ‘events’. 
There are three anticipated “events” associated with oil vulnerability that 
already pose significant risks to Australian cities: 
1. Sudden critical supply interruption 
This event could be triggered by a sudden major loss of production 
in a major field (eg. cyclone Katrina, act of war or terrorism) or a 
similar natural or socio-political event affecting refining or 
distribution further downstream in the supply chain.  The impact of 
such a disruption will be dependent on the extent and duration of 
the interruption.  For the purposes of this exercise, it is assumed 
such interruption would seriously disrupt continuity of supply for a 
period exceeding one month. 
 
2. Volatile price fluctuations and/or intermittent supply disruptions 
This event would be triggered by tensions in the supply/demand 
equation, causing sharp increases in the global price of oil.  This 
phenomenon is highly sensitive to (and, in turn, exerts a significant 
influence on) underlying global economic conditions (Leherrere 
2005; Shah 2005; Rupert& Kane 2006). 
 
3. Progressive price rises and diminution of supply  
This event is a natural flow-on from the passing of the global peak 
of oil production and reflects increasing discrepancy between the 
diminishing capacity of global oil supply and burgeoning underlying 
global demand (Zittel & Schindler 2007). 
 
Each of these “events” has a high probability of occurrence at some point.  
While Australia has not experienced a sudden critical disruption to supply, we 
have (in the 1970‟s) experienced temporary shortages resulting in queuing 
and having some stations temporarily running out of product.  The extremely 
rapid oil price escalation of late 2007/early 2008 up to in the order of $140 bbl 
was a response to rapidly-increasing global demand and the constraints of 
production of “conventional” oil to meet that demand.  The subsequent 
demand collapse associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) no doubt 
exacerbated by escalating oil prices (Hamilton 2009), resulted in oil prices 
collapsing to the order of $30 bbl.  Since that time, prices have risen back to 
in excess of $80 bbl.  This appears to reflect a supply constraint despite 
continuing reduced demand in some markets due to the GFC.  These 
fluctuations are already characteristic of ”event 2” (Nsouli 2006). 
 
It is speculative to anticipate whether the global financial recovery will 
strengthen and increase demand to push prices above $150 bbl, or whether 
the increasing price of oil will trigger further economic turmoil, a recessionary 
double-dip, and roller-coaster price fluctuations.  However, some factors 
impacting on oil prices can be anticipated. 
 
The influence of the temporary price collapse during the GFC had the effect of 
deterring investment in “unconventional” oil such as deep sea oil and some 
alternatives like tar sands and shale oils (IEA 2009).  Thus, as conventional oil 
has peaked, there is a growing concern about reliability of supply, with overall 
decline currently running between 3% and 6% per year.  The rate of 
development of unconventional oil resources is now unlikely to fully offset the 
inevitable continued depletion of conventional oil sources.  This means that it 
is most likely, irrespective of temporary fluctuations, that there will be an 
underlying limitation of supply to meet increasing demand, especially from the 
giant growth economies of India and China.  Thus “event 3” is more than 
likely; it may be inevitable. 
 
The likelihood of “event 1”, a sudden critical disruption to supply is considered 
to be possible though less inevitable than the other two events; however it can 
be quite devastating if it does happen.  The volatility of an “event 2” has 
already been demonstrated and has a very high probability of continuing, as it 
only requires a disruption to supply in some of the most politically vulnerable 
areas on earth such as the Middle East, Nigeria, or Venezuela.  If there is a 
very large disruption, the more common volatility can turn into a critical supply 
disruption, resulting in a sharp punctuation of a combination of event 2 with an 
acceleration of event 3 (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). 
 
There is a range of risks associated with those Peak Oil events that can be 
anticipated over the next twenty years.  The severity of these risks depend to 
a large degree on the nature and pattern of urban development and the 
infrastructure and services necessary to support that development in terms of 
where people live, and work, and how and where they access services 
(Kenworthy pers con 2010; Dodson & Sipe 2005 and 2006; Trubka, Newman 
& Hillsborough 2008).  In order to illustrate and evaluate the risks of peak oil, 
we examine the risk profile associated with three theoretical comparative land 
use response scenarios for urban development.  Each could potentially be 
adopted by any Australian city as part of its town planning strategy for the 
next twenty years in response to issues such as climate change and peak oil.  
These three indicative scenarios enable the possible land development 
opportunities to be evaluated and assessed in terms of peak oil risk.   
 
From this assessment, a preferred scenario (from a peak oil perspective) can 
inform the planning process for Australian cities, and mechanisms to 
effectively manage and mitigate those risks can be developed (Newman, 
McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). 
Potential Scenarios for a Transition from Peak Oil 
Most cities approaching their future are attempting to reduce their car 
dependence and their fossil fuel dependence. Different approaches are often 
adopted and these are discussed in Newman et al (2009) Resilient Cities: 
Responding to Peak Oil and Climate Change. These approaches have been 
summarised into three indicative scenarios. For the purposes of this paper, 
the three scenarios are envisaged for the future, based on where 
development is directed.  The three comparative scenarios are:  
 
 Ruralised Sprawl – where most future development occurs on the 
urban fringe and is designed to be as self sufficient in food as possible. 
 Centralised Concentration – where most future development is directed 
into the CBD area at very high intensities. 
 Decentralised Concentration – where most future development is 
directed into a number of centres distributed along transit routes, in 
medium density, mixed use centres, featuring green technology and 
green buildings with significant landscaping. 
 
The three options are, to some degree, able to be adopted in part, and a 
preferred scenario will be derived from desirable elements of each.  
Ruralised Sprawl 
This option is the most consistent with the present fringe development 
process whereby the majority of development is in greenfields subdivisions. 
The exception from the current trend is that developments are regulated to 
provide much greater self sufficiency in food production (Newman, Beatley & 
Boyer 2009; Holmgren 2005).  This scenario is one that is favoured by a 
substantial group of people addressing peak oil who see that the basic 
agricultural system which is largely based on oil is likely to / experience 
significant problems. The large blocks and open space that are available in 
fringe development is therefore seen as being a resource to enable intensive 
urban agriculture to flourish.  All waste water is treated and recycled back into 
the food production system, and there are community-based composting 
facilities for each area. Food co-operatives are established to help provide 
information and technical support to all who move into the area and to help 
market the produce.  Significant employment related to this agricultural activity 
is developed. 
 
The problem with this model is that it occupies very large land areas 
(effectively suburbanising the whole fringe area very quickly) and it does not 
address the transport issues of the area. The typically low densities of the 
suburban area mean that it is not viable for public transport, walking and 
cycling to major urban services such as major employment centres, schools, 
shopping, and other services.  The development remains very car dependent.  
Thus, under most peak oil events, the economy of such areas remains 
extremely vulnerable.  This happened in the United States when the oil price 
reached $140/bb and whole areas of ruralised settlements were abandoned.   
 
As set out below there are significant costs involved in this option as a result 
of the inability to provide infrastructure and services for such lifestyles.  There 
is also no way of requiring urban agriculture to be the main pursuit of those 
living in the area.  
 
If an eco-village co-operative were formed with the intention of creating a 
more self sufficient agricultural-oriented community, then such options 
become more useful and viable. Food self-sufficiency and eco-village 
cooperative establishment is likely to remain a partial option in the future, 
especially as a complement to the other development pattern scenarios.  As 
cities are designed to provide opportunities other than agriculture, local food 
self-sufficiency is never likely to be the main function of a city region, even 
under extreme disruptions.  As discussed in Resilient Cities [reference], even 
in Havana, which implemented a strong urban agriculture program after the 
sudden disruption due to oil supply cuts after the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1989, the city remains largely non-agricultural in jobs, services and economy, 
despite being 40% self-sufficient in food.  Havana remains a city that is largely 
non car-dependent.  This is its main strategy that enables it to survive in a 
world of oil constraints. 
 
Centralised Concentration 
The opposite of the first option is to direct all new development into high 
density housing around the CBD (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). 
This would need to reclaim relatively underutilised areas near to the city and 
would at least duplicate the number of high rise buildings that are presently in 
most CBDs. The advantages of this option are that it would more effectively 
utilise  much of the infrastructure presently available in the area, it would be 
close to where most of the employment and many of the services are already 
provided, and hence it would save considerably on oil consumption and costs.  
 
The disadvantage is that the area would be so intensively developed it would 
not enable the city to assist those already living in outer suburbs which are the 
most vulnerable areas of the city.  
 
Centralised concentration would also not facilitate the deployment of 
emerging decentralised green technologies such as photovoltaics, localised 
water and waste systems, as they tend to work best distributed across small 
dense urban centres rather than being concentrated in high density city 
centres. It would also be very hard to landscape in the productive way of 
producing food and providing relief to the built form that is more possible in 
the decentralised concentration option.  
 
There is little doubt that there will be an increasing demand for living and 
working in this highly centralised way under the increasing influence of peak 
oil, hence some centralised concentration development must be 
accommodated and facilitated.  However, it is probable that any Australian 
city basing its future solely on high-rise buildings is likely to experience 
political resistance and may not be able to fully adapt to a resilient post-oil city 
form as envisioned by many commentators. 
Decentralised Concentration 
The third option enables the city to develop along corridors of highly efficient 
transit in the form of medium density centres (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, 
Wight, 2010). These Transit Oriented Developments are similar to the pattern 
of life desired in most contemporary  inner city areas of Australian cities. The 
localised access to goods, services and employment would result in a halving 
in the proportion of car use by people living in the area as they are able to use 
public transport much more as well as having options in walking and cycling. 
Where driving is still regarded as the most effective transport mode, the trips 
are generally much shorter.  Under most risk events, the possibility of 
managing reductions in oil use becomes much more feasible due to reduced 
car-dependence. 
 
These distributed sub-centres can then provide opportunities to many in outer 
suburbs to access major urban amenities and services. The centres 
themselves develop in the nature of small cities in the suburbs and will 
become activity nodes for the adapted public transport system to focus. Thus 
bus linkages to the train stations and its associated TOD functions can be 
provided serving the natural catchments throughout the suburbs, providing all 
people in the surrounding community with much greater and less car-
dependent access opportunities.  
 
The centres will provide opportunity for incorporating new green technology 
such as PV cells on roofs, highly energy and water efficient buildings with 
smart metering, plug-in electric vehicles that can help store the renewable 
energy produced in the area, water sensitive urban design and high efficiency 
recycling. These technologies seem to work best when distributed into a 
series of decentralised centres rather than just one centre or, the worst of all, 
scattered and fragmented land uses. Green infrastructure is now being 
developed for zero carbon, zero net water and zero waste developments in 
demonstrations across Australia (see Sustainability Victoria‟s Armstrong 
Creek) and across the globe (eg Masdar in UAE) outlined in Newman, Beatley 
and Boyer (2009).  
 
These centres can also be the places that are landscaped in new and more 
sustainable ways through green roofs and green walls that bring nature into, 
around and over the whole development. This reduces the heat island effect, 
makes buildings more energy efficient reduces water pollution from run-off, 
and is highly attractive for residents due to its natural qualities.  Some of this 
greening can be productive as “edible” landscapes.  This greening of an urban 
development is much easier to do with medium density developments than 
with high rise and single detached housing. 
As well as the many physical planning advantages to this scenario, the 
Polycentric City has also many cost advantages as demonstrated in Trubka, 
Newman and Bilsborough (2010). 
 
Risks Associated with Urban Development Scenarios 
 
It is possible to assess the risks to Australian cities now emerging as a result 
of peak oil. For the purposes of this paper, Table 1 sets out a risk scoring 
matrix as used by the Gold Coast City Council in assessment of risk 
according to combinations of likelihood and severity of consequences.  
 
 










































































































E:  Extreme Risk; immediate action required 
H:  High risk; senior management attention required 
M:  Medium risk; management responsibility must be specified 
L:  Low risk; manage by routine procedures 
[Source Gold Coast City Council Risk Management Policy] 
 
Table 2 sets out the a summary of the relative likelihood of each of the three 
peak oil „events‟ occurring,  as well as the general nature of the risks to 
Australian cities associated with each event  for each of the three indicative 
development scenarios examined (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). 
 
Those risks can be further examined in relation to vulnerable urban sectors 
including the community, business operations and transport.  The likely nature 
and severity of consequences and impacts on those sectors are assessed by 
identifying the vulnerability of oil dependent elements and processes in each 
sector, the critical importance of those elements and processes, and the 
degree to which those elements and processes would be affected by the 
identified risks.  By matching the likelihood of each risk to the likely severity of 
the consequences, the level of risk can be ascertained (as per the risk scoring 
matrix shown at Table 1).  Table 2 also indicates a notional assessment of the 
severity of consequences or impacts and the resultant levels of associated 
risk for each “event” under the three development scenarios.   
 
Table 2 – Likelihood and nature of risks associated with each ‘event’. 

















No available public 
transport. 
(moderate impact / high 
risk) 
Public transport systems unable to cope with 
sudden mode shift. 
(minor impact / medium risk) 
Limited fuel available for 
dispersed economic 
activity 
(major impact / extreme 
risk) 
Sharply-constrained access to goods 
transported by road and/or produced by oil-
vulnerable processes. 
(moderate impact / high risk) 
Inaccessibility to 
services. 
(major impact / extreme 
risk) 
Areas outside the 
CBD highly 
dysfunctional 




of centres highly 
dysfunctional. 
(minor impact / 
medium risk) 
Emergency and essential services constrained 
(minor impact / medium risk) 










sustain transition to the 
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(moderate impact / 
extreme risk) 




















underlying systems and 
processes inhibits 
investment in transition. 
(minor impact / high risk) 
Embodied infrastructure inhibits investment 
shift from oil-dependent to less vulnerable 
patterns and modes 
(minor impact / high risk) 
Limited capacity of 
alternative energies and 
materials to sustain 
current lifestyles and 
services. 
(minor impact / high risk) 
 
As the first vulnerability „event” is “possible” and the others are both “almost 
certain”, the associated risks are typically “high” or “extreme” even where the 
consequences may be conservatively assessed as “minor” or “moderate”.  
This indicates that such risks should be taken seriously and urgent efforts 
made for their treatment or management.  If further, more detailed, analysis 
indicates that the consequences or impacts are likely to prove more serious, 
the level of risks would be even more extreme. 
 
In determining a risk management initiative, it is possible to assess the 
capacity of each indicative development scenario to respond to or ameliorate 
those consequences and impacts.  Consistent with application of other risk 
management strategy methodologies, the potential risk treatments are 
appropriately considered at the various stages of preparedness, prevention, 
response and recovery.  (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010) 
 
“Preparedness” for each of the events would involve establishing less car-
dependent patterns of development, providing a relevant range of less 
vulnerable transport options and, especially under the ruralised scenario, 
increased availability of alternative motive energies such as biofuels and/or 
electricity from renewables .  
 
“Prevention” for each of the events under each of the scenarios would involve 
a combination of community awareness and vulnerability management 
planning. 
 
“Response” for each event for the ruralised scenario would rely on a greater 
focus on localisation and self sufficiency.  For the centralised and 
decentralised concentration scenarios, the response to each event would rely 
on local area planning and transit-orientation as well as facilitating access by 
non-motorised transport (walking and cycling).   
 
“Recovery” for each event for the ruralised scenario would focus on increased 
local self-reliance and local exchange.  For the centralised and decentralized 
concentration scenarios, the recovery from each “event‟ would entail greater 
concentration of a more comprehensive mix of activity and intensity in the 
centres and maximisation of non-motorised access to those centres from their 
natural catchments. 
 
The risk analysis shows that ruralised sprawl is at an extreme risk level from a 
sudden oil supply disruption as it is so car dependent and is at high risk from 
volatile and progressive price rises. The concentration options are much more 
able to cope with sudden supply disruptions as they have other options 
available but both have issues that still need to be addressed.  
 
The worst risk, judged as extreme in our view, is the risk associated with any 
pattern of development with too much reliance on ruralised sprawl which 
would be highly vulnerable to a sudden supply interruption and would be 
severely impacted by both volatile prices and progressive price rises.  This 
pattern of development is highly vulnerable to transport being inadequate, the 
economy being severely disturbed and local and emergency services being 
unable to reach all areas. 
 
There are lesser risks (more manageable especially if appropriate plans are 
prepared and implemented) but nevertheless the risks are “high” for both 
other scenarios due to the likely inability of public transport to cope with 
demand as well as issues associated with freight and emergency services. 
 
Preferred Scenario 
From the risk analysis, a preferred scenario would be a further enhancement 
of the “Decentralised Concentration“  which, in planning terms, is called the 
Polycentric City. The enhancement relates to: 
 
 the provision of high quality transit services with a focus on each centre 
from its immediate catchment and linking each centre to the next 
higher-order centre; 
 the facilitation of local enterprise to foster localised production and 
exchange to minimise the growth (and impact) of the transport task for 
both people and freight; and 
 the retrofitting of existing suburbs and occupied acreages beyond the 
immediate (3km) catchments of significant mixed-use centres to 
become self sufficient but have a better access to jobs and services (in 
the new TOD centres) other than by car;  
 
This optimised scenario will enable a much higher proportion of people to live 
in less car dependent areas. Further, it will enable the highly vulnerable 
suburbs to have more convenient access to local services and jobs in their 
adjacent TOD centres as well as a much more viable transport system linking 
them to their nearest major centre.  The risks from peak oil are minimised and 
the opportunities for responding are greater under this scenario (Newman, 
McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). There is also value in trying to improve local 
food production that is mostly associated with “Ruralised Sprawl” and to 




An over-riding risk is that oil vulnerability will translate into severe impacts of 
likely oil depletion “events”, compromising any Australian city‟s liveability long 
before the measures necessary to reduce that vulnerability are implemented, 
or for more resilient land use patterns to be put in place. 
 
While pursuit of the preferred scenario proposed does promise to ease 
vulnerability to the impacts of oil depletion (both cost and limitation of supply), 
the timeframe needed to transition to such a pattern of development is 
relatively long.  By comparison, it took 17 years to transition from leaded to 
unleaded petrol even though it was supported by Federal legislation and the 
technical adjustments were relatively straight-forward.   
 
Even though most current and proposed town planning provisions seek future 
land use patterns which promise to reduce oil vulnerability, we are unlikely to 
have the luxury of a short timeframe to respond to some of the anticipated 
events associated with peak oil.  The increase in oil consumption in oil 
exporting countries and the inevitable depletion of currently dominant giant 
fields means that progressively less oil will be available on the open market 
irrespective of current rates of production.  The increasing appetite for oil in 
the emerging economies of India, China and others was already putting a 
squeeze on supply capacity before the GFC, and will be a critical factor in 
constraining a global recovery.  The price of oil has already risen from the 
$30/ bbl at the depth of the GFC to the current level of over $80. 
 
As planning schemes and local area plans can only regulate new 
development and redevelopment, and their implementation is dependent on 
the rate of development, they are constrained in quickly influencing existing 
infrastructure and land uses.  The lag time before even the most ambitious 
and progressive planning instruments can change the development pattern 
paradigm is likely to delay full realisation of alternative land use scenarios for 
decades.  To avoid the worst impacts of oil vulnerability, planning provisions 
will need to be complemented by more pro-active intervention by all levels of 
government, industry and the community. 
 
Any detailed oil vulnerability risk management plan must respond to this 
urgency, and provide a comprehensive and timely balance of measures to 
effectively manage the potential rate of decline of oil availability and potential 





The response to any change in Australian cities is usually that it will cost more 
and hence will be difficult. The need to respond to peak oil is however 
becoming an economic imperative as indicated by the oil-price induced Global 
Financial Crash and other papers in this edition.  Our analysis of the 
economics of urban form changes that are required would suggest that they 
should be done whether or not the price of oil and cuts in oil supply impinge 
on the future, though we expect they will and hence the economic implications 
will be even more severe. In Table 3 below the summary of an economic 
study (Trubka, Newman and Bilsborough, 2010) is provided that examined the 
extra costs associated with continuing urban sprawl at the fringe (ruralised 
sprawl) with redevelopment in TODs (decentralized concentration). 
 
Table 3: Estimated Development Costs for a Decentralised 







Infrastructure Costs      
Roads  $5,086,   $30,379 $25,292 
Water and Sewerage  $14,748   $22,378 $7,630 
Telecommunications  $2,576  $3,712 $1,136 
Electricity  $4,082  $9,697  $5,614 
Gas    $3,691 $3,691 
Fire and Ambulance    $302 $302 
Police    $388  $388 
Education  $3,895  $33,147  $29,252 
Health (Hospitals, etc.)  $20,115   $32,347 $12,233 
Total Infrastructure $50,503 $136,041 $85,538 
Transport Costs1      
Transport & Travel Time  $206,542   $342,598 $136,056 
Roads & Parking  $46,938   $154,826 $107,889 
Externalities  $2,220  $9,705 $7,486 
Total Transport $255,700 $507,130 $251,430 
                                                        
1
 Transport costs are calculated as operating costs and thus are a function of vehicle 
kilometers traveled (VKT) and patronage. 
Greenhouse Gas Cost2      
Offset Cost ($25/t) $2,500 $5,400 $2,900 
Social Cost ($215/t) – 
NOT  INCLUDED IN 
TOTAL 
$21,500 $46,440 $24,940 
Total Greenhouse $2,500 $5,400 $2,900 
Physical Activity Costs    
Healthcare Cost     $4,230 
Productivity Loss   $34,455 
Total Activity Costs   $38,685 
Total  $308,702  $687,316 $378,553 
 
The costs display the differential cost streams associated with the two 
alternative development paths. Many of the estimates were made 
conservatively: infrastructure costs may vary depending on excess capacity 
levels and area-specific requirements; greenhouse gas costs are dependant 
on a price for carbon and will go up or down accordingly; and health savings 
are dependant on the types of mode-specific infrastructure put into place 
combined with incentive schemes and public education.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the infrastructure costs are up-front costs that require 
payment upon initial development. The transport, greenhouse gas, health 
costs and productivity losses are present values calculated over a 50-year 
period and could be considered as operating costs of the respective types of 
development, except for the health and productivity costs which were 
calculated as foregone benefits by choosing to develop on the fringe (hence 
them being omitted from the inner-city and fringe cost streams). 
Nevertheless, the size of the different costs does provide some 
perspective on the overall costs of ruralised sprawl and the savings if a less 
oil-vulnerable urban form was adopted. Other studies (summarised in Trubka 
et al 2010) have indicated the substantial costs of infrastructure and transport, 
which we too have demonstrated and which should be of considerable 
concern to cities contemplating a future with plans to continue major 
greenfields development. However, we can now see that two of the newer 
parameters relating to urban development – the social costs of greenhouse 
and health-related productivity due to greater walkability – add another 
                                                        
2
 The Cumulative Economic Impact Statement does not include the social cost of carbon 
(SCC) from transport greenhouse gas emissions. It is assumed that abatement, 
being the more cost-effective option, would be preferred over sustaining the 
harm or global warming; however, without proper policy measures put in place 
the social costs will continue to surmount. 
substantial cost rationale to the value of redevelopment where considerably 
more active transport modes are built-in to the urban form. The productivity 
gains are alone quite considerable and appear to be around a 6% increase in 
workforce productivity due to less absenteeism and more on-job productivity. 
A Glimpse of the Future in 2040 
 
In order to grasp the opportunities that an appropriate and timely response to 
Peak Oil presents, a glimpse into the potential future of a typical Australian 
city is provided – if the city does everything right.  It shows some direction for 
how the city and its hinterland can respond to creating a thriving, sustainable 
and resilient post peak-oil city (Newman, McCarthy, Boyle, Wight, 2010). 
 
By 2040 the world will have to have reduced its oil consumption by at least 
50%.  The Australian city has shown it can do much better than this... 
 
A Polycentric, transit oriented city with much reduced need to travel. 
A series of sub-centres or „cities in the suburbs‟ emerge throughout the urban 
region as new rail lines are opened and extended to link sub-centres and to 
provide well-serviced nodes as the focus of each sub-centre.  These centres 
provide opportunities for people in the suburbs to shop, reach services, go to 
the movies, jobs and schools, as well as have a place to meet friends and 
walk around.  They are all linked by good cross suburban bus services, 
providing a high quality of service to each centre from its natural catchment.  
The buses all run on natural gas or are plug-in electric buses and provide a 
high quality service to each centre from its natural catchment.  The region is 
criss-crossed with cycle paths between centres accessing and serving each 
new centre.  The main CBD, as well as each sub-centre, has a walkability 
plan that enables a constant upgrading of the pedestrian environment.  Based 
on early 21st century comparisons the urban region now has at least 50% less 
private vehicle use complemented by a wider range of attractive mobility 
options. 
 
Supplemented by private Plug in Electric Vehicles that enable 100% 
renewably derived power. 
The urban region is surrounded by wind farms and on every rooftop PV cells 
are drawing on the sun to provide renewable power into the grid – which has 
been upgraded to provide economical energy storage capacity, smart control 
systems and smart meters to manage the fluctuations in supply.  At each 
home, shopping centre and business, shared plug-in electric vehicles are 
parked; each vehicle is part of a program to enable renewable power to be 
stored and released back into the grid as demand rises during the day.  
Owners program how much their PEV‟s can contribute back to the grid 
knowing that they will earn money from the utility as power is more expensive 
during peak periods than at night.  Quick recharging can be obtained at each 
sub-centre and from service stations now converted to provide 100% 
renewable power and natural gas. 
 
A Highly Eco-efficient City using Renewable Natural Gas for Freight and 
Industry 
Natural gas has become the fuel for those vehicles that previously used diesel 
in the old days of oil, but which are not amenable to powering by renewable 
electricity.  Industry also uses natural gas for process heat though the amount 
needed for manufacturing and production is now reduced by a factor of 4 or 5 
due to a myriad of clever eco-efficient technologies.  Natural gas was 
abundant due especially to coal seam gas but in recent years natural gas is 
being created from CO2 at power stations with the use of giant solar 
collectors.  The natural gas is distributed through pipes and is stored and 
exported as LNG. 
 
A Biophilic, Beautiful, Cool City with a Strong Sense of Place 
As part of its Climate Change and Peak Oil Strategy the CBD high rise area 
as well as the intensive mixed-use sub-centres, have become models for 
reducing the urban heat island effect through landscaping.  Every building has 
green roofs (along with PV‟s), and green walls that drape across the city and 
join up with street trees and urban parks.  The biodiversity of the city has 
created a whole new movement of urban bird watchers.  New small creeks 
channel storm water that is slowly released from the biophilic buildings.  The 
city revels in its new identity as one of the greenest cities in the world. The city 
and most centres in the region doing similar landscaping are 5C cooler than 
they were in the heat stress days of the early 21st century. 
 
A City that Feeds Itself 
A further extrapolation of the biophilic transformation includes the use of 
green roofs and walls as well as a proportion of ground level greenspace as 
“edible urban landscape”.  The limitation of expansion of the urban footprint 
affords the protection of valuable ecosystems, the delivery of ecosystem 
services, nature-based outdoor recreation and, importantly, increasing 
excellence and capacity in sustainable organic food production.  The 
combination of these initiatives will substantially increase the availability of 
fresh, local foods and reduce the transport impacts of excessive “food miles”.  
 
Conclusions 
Australian cities are vulnerable to peak oil. For that reason alone we should 
be showing global leadership on this issue. There are real risks that need to 
be assessed in all land development issues. However it is also an opportunity 
to address a number of structural issues that can manage the need to reduce 
carbon and other resources, to reduce car dependence in general, to respond 
to the new smart and sustainable technologies for energy, water and waste 
that work best in the decentralized concentration urban form, and the 
opportunity to create a beautiful biophilic city through intensive greening of all 
new development.   A creative and positive response to the challenges posed 
by peak oil will therefore help to achieve a range of other urban objectives and 
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